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‘Just Peace’, Just Peace – What Peace? 
The US and Russia’s Conceptual Approaches 
to Peace and Conflict Settlement 
Evgeniya Bakalova and Konstanze Jüngling 
ABSTRACT 
In theoretical terms ‘peace’ remains a largely contested concept. Academics propose competing 
definitions and conceptualizations, which possess their own normative and analytical advan-
tages or disadvantages. Yet despite heated academic and theoretical debates, studies looking at 
the empirical understandings of peace and conflict-settlement strategies of different states are 
largely missing. In this paper, we set out to cover this gap and ask how similarities and differ-
ences in the actors’ conceptual understandings of peace play themselves out in their agreement 
and disagreement over the advocated ‘peace strategies’. Employing qualitative/quantitative con-
tent analysis of the statements made by the representatives of the Russian Federation and the 
United States at the UN Security Council, we analyze the debates around four recent and/or 
ongoing conflicts (Georgia 2008, Libya 2011, Syria 2011-2014 and Ukraine 2014). The study 
reveals that while agreement over the conceptualization of peace does not impede further dis-
agreement as to the advocated peace strategies, disagreement at the conceptual level breeds 
deeper disagreement. 
1 INTRODUCTION1 
“It is a characteristic feature of peace – that it cannot be defined” wrote Georg Picht in 1975, 
implying that the controversy over which type of societal order constitutes ‘peace’ is itself the 
object of all political conflicts (Picht 1975: 46). The fierce academic debates over the definition 
and contents of peace within the peace research community – which have so far not produced a 
consensual theoretic understanding of the concept – yield certain truth to this quote. At the 
same time these debates have not resulted in any systematic attempts at investigating the actual 
empirical understandings as employed by different actors in specific conflict situations. This 
research gap is surprising, since the relevant conceptualization of peace in each particular con-
flict might have important repercussions for the actors’ preferred conflict resolution strategies. 
Taking into account the diversity of theoretical conceptions and definitions of peace, we set 
forward to fill this gap by empirically investigating the diversity of political conceptions of peace, 
as well as their interrelations with the relevant peace strategies advocated by states in specific 
conflict situations. The identified research gap raises a number of interesting questions, which 
have received little attention in the literature. Is the plurality of conceptual definitions of peace 
within the theoretical debate also reflected in the political debates on peace and over the appro-
priate means of achieving it? Are these invoked consistently or on a situational basis? What are 
the inter-linkages between the actors’ different understandings of peace and the conflict resolu-
tion proposals they make? How do these interact with each other within and across particular 
conflicts?   
This study focuses on the relevant concepts of peace as verbally invoked by official representa-
tives of the Russian Federation and the United States. As members of the great powers club, both 
have a particularly weighty say “in determining issues that affect the peace and security of the 
                                                 
 
1  A previous version of this paper was presented at the WISC Fourth Global International Studies Conference, 6-8 
August 2014, Frankfurt am Main. The authors would like to thank Harald Müller and Tongfi Kim for valuable com-
ments and critique.   
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international system as a whole” (Bull 2002: 196). As permanent members of the United Nations 
Security Council and wielders of the veto power, they can block or enhance international con-
flict resolution efforts. Consequently their specific approaches to peace and their conceptual 
agreements and disagreements are of particular significance for the overall management, resolu-
tion or perpetuation of particular conflicts. We investigate their officially invoked conceptualiza-
tions of peace and proposed conflict settlement strategies in four recent or ongoing conflicts, 
which have arguably been of particular importance to one or both of the actors: the Russian-
Georgian Five-Day War of 2008, the crisis in Libya and the NATO intervention of 2011, the 
ongoing civil war in Syria and the recent conflict in and over Ukraine 20142.    
While much has already been written about the different positions, possible underlying motiva-
tions, diverging interests and capabilities of the United States and Russia in relation to the con-
flicts analyzed here, this paper takes a different analytical lens. Namely, it sets out to investigate 
how the diverging conceptual understandings of peace play themselves out in the actors’ favored or 
promoted conflict resolution proposals, and how these interact with each other and in relation to 
different conflict situations. Taking into consideration the limited analytical and methodological 
scope of this study, it does not aim at delivering generalizable explanations for the overall con-
duct of the two states in these particular crises or extrapolating its conclusions to other actors’ 
overall behavior in conflicts. What this paper suggests is that a comparative examination of 
voiced subject-positions may shed light on the actors’ salient underlying conceptualizations, 
which, taken together with other factors (material, structural and ideational), might potentially 
contribute to the analytical understanding of complex interaction processes in conflict inception 
and resolution.  
This paper offers a first step towards descriptive inference about the empirical manifestations of 
peace and opens an analytical perspective on the possible implications these might have for the 
actors’ conflict resolution approaches. Our investigation reveals that there is indeed a divergence 
in political conceptualizations of peace. Divergent conceptualizations do not only manifest 
themselves in the clashes of subject-positions of actors in specific conflicts, but might also have 
meaningful repercussions for the actors’ disagreement over the propagated peace strategies. 
Moreover, depending on the conflict situation different conceptions of peace might be invoked 
by the same actors, revealing the inconsistencies of specific claims. The analysis suggests that 
while agreement over the conceptualization of peace does not impede further disagreement as to 
the appropriate peace strategies, disagreement at the conceptual level fosters deeper disagree-
ments in regard to the propagated policy options. 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we provide a brief summary of the theoretical debates on 
the concept of peace and outline the diversity of conceptual understandings, discussing the 
strengths and weaknesses of each conceptualization. The outlined analytical distinctions then 
provide the basis for the conceptual framework of our content-analysis, which is further de-
scribed in more detail in the methodological section. Here the logic behind the selected sources 
is also explained. Subsequently we move to the empirical analysis of the four cases in question, 
providing brief summaries of the conceptual understandings that have been employed by Russia 
and the US in each particular conflict. Finally, we draw our conclusions regarding the consisten-
cy of and inter-linkages between the particular conceptions of peace and the actors’ voiced pref-
erences for conflict resolution, including their disposition to the use and non-use of force.      
                                                 
 
2  The analysis of the ongoing conflicts in Syria and Ukraine is chronologically limited to July 1, 2014 (before the down-
ing of the passenger plane MH17). 
3 
 
PRIF Working Paper No. 22 
2 THE THEORETICAL DISCUSSION ON PEACE: PLURALITY OF ANALYTICAL CONCEPTIONS  
2.1 The Importance of Arriving at a Shared Understanding 
The reflections on peace are as old as the history of conflict itself (Koppe 2005: 18). As early as 
426 AD Augustine in his famous writing De civitate dei (“The City of God”) laid out his eschato-
logical understanding of peace conceptualizing it as some form of eternal and final state entered 
by human beings after death (Augustinus 1978). At the same time, philosophy of peace is not an 
exclusive Western exercise, as exemplified by the Gandhian conception of peace, or Ubuntu – 
one of the various African perspectives on peace.  Such work devoted to specifying and describ-
ing the meaning and content of peace is important given the various functions performed by its 
definition. In general four such functions can be identified: 1) the constitutive/discipline-
building function; 2) the normative-regulative function; 2) the political function, as well as 4) 
the action-guiding function. Whereas the first function is most closely related to the academic 
discussions on the raison d’être of any research devoted to peace, the last three might have direct 
repercussions for political practice.  
First and foremost, definitions of peace specify what issues become relevant when considering 
questions of war and peace. In this sense, the concept performs an important constitu-
tive/discipline-building function (Schwerdtfeger 2001: 27, Weller 2005: 93). As peace research 
seeks societal recognition as science, it has to explicate in what respect it differs from existing 
academic disciplines (Weller 2005: 93).  
In contrast to the discipline-building function, the normative-regulative function (Schwerdt-
feger 2001: 27) is relevant from a practical point of view. More specifically, peace is not only a 
phenomenon to be scientifically analyzed and examined, but also a value to be politically im-
plemented and maintained (ibid.). Consequently, peace is routinely referred to as some form of 
normative or regulative compass for domestic and foreign policies, potentially yielding far-
reaching practical implications depending on the respective understanding at hand. The norma-
tive-regulative function is thus closely linked to the political and action-guiding functions of the 
peace concept. Whereas the political function refers to peace as a political norm whose contents 
are constantly re-negotiated and discussed in public debate, the action-guiding function denotes 
the possibility of translating abstract concepts into concrete, policy-relevant peace strategies: 
“Definitions of peace imply strategies for peace. The definition of the (peace-)conflict 
term is ultimately a declaration of intent concerning the (peace-)conflict strategy to be 
pursued” (Schwerdtfeger 2001: 28). 
Given its important functions, it becomes apparent that any understanding of peace should be as 
consensual as possible, both from a theoretical and practical perspective. Especially when joint 
efforts for crisis settlement are required, a minimal consensus in relation to the understanding of 
what constitutes peace is needed in order to avoid deadlock situations or even counter-
productive outcomes. Consequently, “true peace is a peace which is produced and maintained by 
the many and is not only organized by the few for the many” (Schwerdtfeger 2001: 14). Such an 
understanding, however, can only be produced and maintained by means of reasoning and 
agreement. This is mainly due to the factual plurality of interests, values and consequently inter-
pretations, which render the mere imposition of pre-defined normative ideas futile:  
“the (…) world of humankind, in its plurality of powers, of interests, of ‘passions’, belief 
attitudes and systems, balks at proselytism, of whatever kind (…)” (Sternberger 1984: 13). 
2.2 Competing Theoretical Conceptualizations of Peace 
The plurality of understandings already manifests itself within the academic debate, which lacks 
a consensual agreement on the substance of peace. In the following, we will discuss five major 
conceptual dichotomies framing the academic controversy. While the theoretical debate over the 
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theoretical definitions of peace is not exhausted by the brief summary provided here, it provides 
the basis for the conceptual framework of our empirical investigation. 
Narrow vs. broad conceptions of peace 
The narrow vs. broad dichotomy in the conceptualization of peace refers the question of whether 
peace can be defined as the sole absence of direct, collective violence – and thus requires the 
transformation of violent conflict into a non-violent one –, or whether it also presupposes the 
absence of structural violence and thus necessitates the elimination of the root causes of conflict. 
The latter notion has been largely influenced by Johan Galtung, one of the major promoters of a 
broad understanding of violence and peace. According to him, violence is present whenever 
human beings are influenced in a way that their “actual somatic and mental realizations are 
below their potential realizations” (Galtung 1975: 9). Consequently, violence does not only in-
clude direct, physical violence, but also more indirect forms of oppression without a clear sub-
ject-object-relation, so-called structural violence (ibid.: 13). Structural violence manifests itself 
in social injustices. Thus, in order to qualify as peace, a situation must be characterized by both 
the absence of direct, physical violence, as well as of structural violence (ibid.: 32). In Galtung’s 
conception, peace is inextricably linked to the provision of equal opportunities in life and is thus 
inseparably linked to the provision of social justice. 
Such a broad understanding of peace has its strengths and weaknesses. Thus it draws attention 
to the whole spectrum of inadequate social conditions providing a holistic perspective on the 
phenomenon of peace. Within a broad conception of peace it becomes impossible to conceive of 
an unjust regime as peaceful (Müller 2003: 209-16). However, the broad conception of peace 
possesses a number of severe shortcomings as compared to the narrow understanding. Broad 
conceptions run the risk of legitimizing the use of force, as the elimination of violent conflicts 
may itself necessitate the application of violent means (Brock 2002: 100, Müller 2003: 212). As 
Brock puts it, „if violence is so omnipresent, as Galtung’s definition suggests, non-violent behav-
ior is extremely unlikely” (Brock 2002: 101), and the prospects of establishing peace “by peaceful 
means” become rather dire. What is more, the adoption of a broad conception of peace is associ-
ated with certain analytical difficulties. In particular, it has been argued that the broad concep-
tion risks becoming imprecise and “meaningless” (Brock 2002: 99, Müller 2003: 209-16). Conse-
quently these might become subject to politicized misuse and serve as rhetorical justifications 
for interventionist intentions. On the other hand, narrow definitions of peace as the absence of 
large-scale physical violence might be misused for the justification of non-action and legitimiza-
tion of oppressive political regimes.    
Positive vs. negative conception of peace 
Since the narrow vs. broad conceptual distinction emphasizes either the absence of physical 
violence or the realization of more encompassing social justice, it is sometimes treated synony-
mously with the negative vs. positive dichotomy in the conceptualization of peace. The debate 
here revolves around the question whether the peace definition is developed via negationis 
(through establishing conditions which are to be absent in a situation of peace) or affirmatively 
(by outlining the specific characteristics of peace) (Huber 1971: 40). Defining peace as the ab-
sence of war would, for instance, be a negative understanding of peace, whereas considering 
harmony, order or justice as constitutive of peace (Banks 1987, Johnson 1976) would reflect a 
positive understanding.  
Similar to broad and narrow conceptions, positive and negative understandings of peace also 
possess their strengths and weaknesses. The negative conceptualization, as it has been critically 
remarked, lacks an integrating goal or vision perceived as desirable beyond the mere absence of 
war (Meyers 1994: 66). While acknowledging that ‘negative peace’ is indeed a minimum re-
quirement for the peaceful co-existence of humankind, discomfort in relation to such under-
standing results mainly from the claim that negative peace alone is not sufficient for arriving at a 
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situation of peace (Lailach 1998: 28). ‘Positive peace’, however, can be arbitrarily filled with 
whatever meanings one prefers (Meyers 1994: 68). For instance, there is no single/unified con-
cept of justice; instead, it can be interpreted and understood in various ways (e.g. procedural, 
substantive, distributional justice) (Müller 2003: 212). A premature specification of the positive 
contents of peace without a previous systematic, empirical examination would run the risk of 
ideologizing particularistic worldviews (Huber 1971: 43).  
Long-term vs. short-term peace 
Another conceptual dichotomy concerns the temporal dimension of peace. The question here is 
whether peace is only conceivable as long-term peace or whether temporally limited, short-term 
peace can also be conceptualized as peace. Whereas under a positive, broad conception peace 
necessarily has to be long-term, proponents of a narrow understanding would generally agree 
that peace has to be somewhat durable, since “peace presupposes a certain degree of stability; a 
‘second-long peace’ is absurd” (Müller 2003: 219). Consequently, Lothar Brock considers the 
durability of peace to be one of four “Pluses”, which can be added to and combined with a nar-
row understanding of peace. Similarly, Ernst-Otto Czempiel argues that if taken seriously, the 
self-discriminating, negative peace is exceptionally demanding: 
“[Negative peace] does not denominate the avoidance of war, as has been successfully 
pursued for forty years in the East-West Conflict, not the temporal absence of armed hos-
tilities, but their permanent elimination” (Czempiel 2002: 85). 
In order to arrive at a situation of non-war, Czempiel argues, war as an approach to conflict 
management has to be abolished and substituted by different conflict management tools (ibid.) 
The Geographical Scope of Peace: Global vs. Local  
Similar to the question regarding the durability of peace, the issue of geographical scope is main-
ly debated by the proponents of a narrow, negative conception of peace. For advocates of a posi-
tive, broad understanding, a divisible, regional peace would be a contradictio in adiecto, as peace 
can only be truly stable as a whole, i.e. as world peace. Only through the provision of equal life 
opportunities for everyone can structural violence be eliminated, which makes the collective use 
of force obsolete. Against this background, Georg Picht argued that it is impossible to adequate-
ly describe a situation as peace without the existence of a more encompassing world society 
(Picht 1971: 23f). 
In contrast, proponents of a narrow conception of peace are more divided on the issue. While 
peace within the OECD could have been regarded as relatively stable prior to September 11, 
2001, the terror attacks have tragically revealed that it became increasingly difficult for OECD 
countries to isolate themselves against violent conflicts in their peripheries (Brock 2002). Due to 
existing markets of violence, OECD countries become increasingly entangled in conflicts outside 
the OECD area (Brock 2002: 107). For the “OECD peace” to be durable, peace, according to 
Brock, has to be of a universal nature. Yet world peace needs not necessarily be a unitary peace:  
“In the end, [peace] is only conceivable as a constellation, in which people peacefully co-
exist in all parts of the world according to their own assessment, according to their own 
sentiments” (Brock 2002: 106). 
The conviction regarding the necessity of world peace is not shared by all proponents of a nar-
row understanding of peace. According to Müller, regardless of the increasing global interde-
pendencies, peace in Scandinavia, for instance, cannot be contested or hampered by unpeaceful 
relations in Sierra Leone. Equally, it is possible in his view to describe the state of affairs in the 
member states of the European Union as peaceful, while at the same time exempting certain 
regions such as Northern Ireland or the Basque region: “If peace is only supposed to be world 
peace, why then differentiate between the two terms?” (Müller 2003: 216).  
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Unit of Reference and Level of Analysis: Collective vs. Individual 
Any conceptualization of peace inevitably necessitates a decision on who the intended benefi-
ciaries of peace are. However, despite its fundamental importance the question of peace address-
ees is rarely explicated or thoroughly addressed within the academic debate (Czempiel 1972: 39). 
The proponents of the broad understanding of peace often implicitly refer to humankind in its 
entirety as a starting point. This, however, is problematic. In particular, specific reference to 
humankind as the primary addressee of peace risks vesting peace researchers with “a veil of 
cloudiness” (ibid), as it places the concept of peace so far beyond political reality that it can easi-
ly be verbally reconciled with any kind of aggressive and unpeaceful policies. More specifically, 
what “world peace” demands, is adaptable at will to whatever interests states may pursue (ibid). 
By contrast, taking only certain groups as the unit of reference risks creating particularistic vi-
sions of peace and is thus undesirable from a normative perspective. According to Czempiel, the 
unit of reference for peace can thus only be the individual – albeit only in her or his function as 
a member of a group. At the same time this limitation does not “(…) constrain the claim of each 
individual to be fully included into any concept of peace. [It] only confirms his existence as an 
individual. It is societal existence whose level of self-fulfillment can only be measured on the 
basis of the individual and in that sense can only be judged by him” (Czempiel 1972: 44). 
Similar to the problem of the unit of reference, the level of analysis for a given concept of peace 
is rarely problematized or scrutinized either (Czempiel 1972: 18). Yet there is more than one 
level upon which peace can be conceptualized: starting from the level of the individual to the 
level of certain groups, the state or even the international system. Whereas prioritizing the level 
of the state or the system is common in IR, scholars mainly interested in domestic inner-societal 
dynamics tend to give more weight to the level of certain groups or the individual. Others try to 
find some middle ground. Müller, for instance, takes the collective, i.e. the state, as the level of 
analysis. However, in order to address the increasing number of internal as compared to inter-
state conflicts, he distinguishes between internal and external peace (Müller 2003: 216). 
3 FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: METHODOLOGY, SOURCES AND DESIGN 
As the previous section has already outlined, the conceptualization of peace (and consequently 
of the appropriate ways of achieving it) remains a highly contested analytical issue. At the same 
time, the heated theoretical and normative debates have so far not resulted in any attempts at 
grasping the empirical diversity of peace conceptualizations as employed by different actors in 
various conflict situations and over time. Since understandings and definitions of peace render 
specific implications for concrete policy choices in conflict situations (Schwerdtfeger 2001: 28), 
one might argue that diverging empirical conceptualizations might foster or deepen existing 
disagreements over the appropriate conflict-settlement and peace-building measures or strate-
gies. The primary aim of this empirical investigation is examining how different conceptions of 
peace are invoked by different actors and how those play themselves out in the actors’ agreement 
or disagreement over the ways of ending violent conflicts.    
With this aim in mind, qualitative and quantitative content analysis is employed in order to 
systematically analyze the conceptualizations of peace and peace strategies in the official com-
munication of the Russian Federation and the United States. Four recent or ongoing conflicts, 
directly relevant for one or both of the actors, have been selected as case studies: the Russian-
Georgian war (2008), the conflict in Libya prior to and following the NATO intervention (2011-
2012), the ongoing civil war in Syria (2011-2014) and the recent crisis in Ukraine shortly before 
and after Russia’s annexation of Crimea (2014). All of these conflicts have arguably been marked 
by a higher (as in the case of Crimea) or lower (as in the case of Libya) degree of disagreement 
between the Russian Federation and the United States in what concerned the possible conflict 
resolution options.  
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The database is comprised of 40 Security Council meeting records, which include a total of 79 
individual statements over five years (2008, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014) from four official represent-
atives of Russia and eight representatives of the United States. The Security Council debates 
were selected as the primary source for the analysis for a number of methodological and practi-
cal reasons. First of all, the UN Security Council serves as the primary forum for determining 
“the existence of any threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and deciding 
upon the measures “to maintain or restore international peace and security” (UN Charter, 
Chapter VII, Art. 39). Second, since both states act as permanent members, their representatives 
are present (and can deliver their statements) at all the meetings, which allows for a systematic 
comparative examination of their publicly voiced positions on different issues and conflicts over 
time as well as in relation to each other. Third, the statements made by states’ representatives 
before the UN body directly reflect the official positions of their respective governments towards 
the particular conflict.  Fourth, and most practically relevant, the UN Official Document System 
(ODS) and the UN Bibliographic Information System (UNBIS) offer easily accessible and 
searchable verbatim records of all the UNSC formal (and open) meetings.  
For coding purposes a deductive theory-driven coding scheme was created based on the existing 
conceptualizations of peace in the literature and current academic debates. The scheme was later 
inductively updated in the course of the empirical analysis to account for some specific practical 
issues covered in the Security Council discussions (see Table 1). As it has already been men-
tioned earlier, the coding scheme was largely informed by the five conceptual distinctions as 
they are discussed in the literature: narrow vs. broad, positive vs. negative, short-term vs. long-
term, local vs. global, individual vs. collective3.  
Aside from some minor inductive updates (like adding the code “International Criminal Prose-
cution” for the Libyan and later Syrian cases), the categories within the coding framework were 
intentionally kept as general as possible in order to ensure the possibility of cross-case and cross-
country comparisons.  Only those statements containing at least one reference to the concept of 
peace or conflict settlement (as laid down in the coding framework) have been coded. The 
smallest unit of analysis was presented by an argument: one sentence may contain multiple ar-
guments, but similar arguments appearing in separate (consecutive) sentences were coded sepa-
rately. Thus, a syntactic sentence was treated as the largest unit of analysis (see Table 1 for ex-
amples of coded statements).   
The categories presented in the coding matrix are neither completely exhaustive, nor mutually 
exclusive, but rather present abstract and generalizable terms for capturing frequently invoked 
concepts and understandings of peace and conflict resolution options within state agents’ speech 
acts. Quantitative content analysis was employed in order to capture the frequency of references 
to particular concepts and ideas and to look at their development over time and across different 
actors, while qualitative content analysis was used in order to specifically look at the meanings 
employed and to establish their interconnections.  
We do not assess the states’ underlying motives, interests or motivations. Moreover, this analysis 
is not about establishing the root causes of the analyzed conflicts or assessing the respective roles 
                                                 
 
3  The first five codes presented in the coding framework (“Understanding of peace”, “(Temporal) Scope”, “Level of 
application/Unit of reference”, “(Source of) Violence” and “Outreach/Geographical scope”) are designed to capture the 
different ways in which the representatives of states grasp the concept of peace. Within the category “Understanding of 
peace” the first five sub-codes (Civil and political rights, Social justice, Democratic form of government, Rule of law, 
Civil peace) are designed to capture broad conceptualizations of peace, while the latter two (Basic human rights and 
Ceasefire) refer to a narrow conception (understood as cessation of violence). Similarly the first six sub-codes within 
this category refer to a positive understanding of peace, while the last one denotes a negative understanding. Within the 
“(Temporal) Scope” category only those statements explicitly containing words such as “long-term” and ”durable” were 
coded . In terms of geographical scope (“Outreach”), once again, only those statements were coded that contained a di-
rect literal reference to the global or regional dimension of the conflict in order to avoid the inflationary use of the 
code. The latter three codes (“Peace through (external means)/(internal means)” and “Post-conflict settlement”) are 
used to capture the states’ specific proposals for crisis management and conflict settlement. 
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Russia, the United States or both played or continue to play in their inception, resolution, per-
petuation, escalation or de-escalation. Neither does this study aim at explaining the particular 
actions or reactions of the actors in these conflict situations. For these reasons the study stops 
short of making generalizable claims as to Russia’s or the United States’ behavior and strategies 
in conflicts and their overall approaches to conflict resolution. Indeed, multiple factors (domes-
tic, institutional and structural) contribute to the actual policy outputs, which this empirical 
investigation does not address. This study rather attempts at presenting the diverging and/or 
converging voiced conceptual understandings and various discursive interpretations, represen-
tations and positions on peace and peace efforts as invoked by the United States and the Russian 
Federation.    
4  EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION: THE US AND RUSSIAN CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES 
TO PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
4.1  The August War between Russia and Georgia: Tables Turned?  
The so-called Five-Day Russian-Georgian war of 2008 has become the first inter-state conflict 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union which Russia became party to militarily. It came as a sur-
prise to the international political and academic community and quickly produced talk about a 
new confrontation and prophecies of a ‘New Cold War’ (for a critical assessment see: Sakwa 
2008; Makarychev 2011). The conflict has been characterized by an unexpected role reversal 
between the old Cold War rivals, in which Russia, a traditional advocate of the principle of non-
interference and strong opponent of military interventions after what it had deemed to be disas-
trous military campaigns in Yugoslavia and Iraq, started actively employing humanitarian rheto-
ric and explicitly normative ‘liberal interventionist’ arguments. Meanwhile the United States, the 
‘world gendarme’ and the main propagator of a liberal world order, resorted to sovereignty-
based, explicitly non-interventionist argumentation. This raises multiple questions, but the one 
relevant for this research is how these different positions and conceptualizations interrelated 
with each other in the course of the crisis.   
Before we move to the actual analysis, we shall shortly recapitulate the main events. The chro-
nology and the interpretations are still being largely contested by both Russia and Georgia, but 
the report of an independent fact-finding mission mandated by the Council of the European 
Union allows a rough reconstruction of the course and consequences of the conflict (see Inde-
pendent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia 2009 I, II, III). It started 
on the night of 7 to 8 August with a Georgian artillery strike on the city of Tskhinvali in South 
Ossetia, which was followed by Russian air force and artillery strikes on Georgian targets and a 
subsequent military intervention in the early afternoon of August 8. Russian troops rapidly 
forced the Georgian military out of South Ossetia and penetrated deeply into Georgian territory, 
stopping short of the capital. After five days of military hostilities (hence the name ‘Five-Day 
War’) a preliminary ceasefire was agreed on August 12 between Russia and Georgia under the 
mediation efforts of France. On August 26 Russia responded to the appeal of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia unilaterally recognizing the breakaway republics’ independence, which resulted in 
Georgia cutting diplomatic relations with Moscow. Although then President Medvedev signed 
an agreement on the withdrawal of Russian troops on September 8 (the so-called ‘implementa-
tion agreement’), the last troops left Georgian territory only in October 2008. The EU-mandated 
mission reported, that the Georgian military operation and the Russian invasion resulted in 
around 850 deaths (military and civilian) and more than 100,000 people displaced from their 
homes (Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia 2009 II: 223, 
224).      
Although most of the negotiations between the representatives of Russia, Georgia and the Unit-
ed States with then European Council President Nicolas Sarkozy acting as a semi-official media-
tor took place behind closed doors and through secure telephone lines, the Security Council, 
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paralyzed throughout and incapable of either preventing or solving the conflict, provided a sce-
ne for a public exchange of official subject-positions, justifications and mutual accusations. The 
Security Council met four times during the actual crisis (twice on August 8 upon request of 
Russia and later Georgia and on August 10 upon request of Georgia and the United States; the 
UNSC also held a closed meeting on August 11) and twice in its immediate aftermath (on Au-
gust 19 and 28)4. During the conflict, it failed thrice to agree upon a statement calling for an 
immediate ceasefire and a truce. The Security Council later returned to the conflict in order to 
prolong the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia, but since it is widely assumed that 
the military conflict ended with the signing of the implementation agreement on September 8 
(Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia 2009 I: 22), this 
analysis will only consider the five open UNSC meetings, which took place from August 8 to 
August 28.  
As it has been noted above, Russia is believed to have surprisingly and unexpectedly taken “a 
discursive jump” and positioned itself as “an actor engaging in a local conflict as a guardian of 
those in danger and more generally a defender of the value-based international society” 
(Joenniemi 2011: 104). While heavily emphasizing the breach of the agreement on the non-use 
of force on Georgia’s part, Russia’s UN Representative Vitaly Churkin had been gradually build-
ing up the justificatory narrative for Russia’s own use of force, first pointing to “reports of ethnic 
cleansing in the villages of South Ossetia”5, then reporting casualties among the Russian peace-
keepers and finally referring to the right of the Russian Federation to protect the “lives and dig-
nity” of its compatriots “in accordance with the Constitution of Russia and in accordance with 
the laws of the Russian Federation and international law” (S/PV. 5952). Shortly after Russia’s 
military invasion on August 8 Churkin announced that Russia was intervening “as a real peace-
keeper” in its traditional role as a “guarantor of the security of the peoples of the Caucasus” 
(ibid).  
Because of its false allegations of genocide in South Ossetia, the Russian government had been 
subsequently accused of misusing the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm in order to legiti-
mize its military intervention in Georgia (Badescu/Weiss 2010: 364; Stuenkel 2014: 13). Russia’s 
UN representative did indeed point out to the “large loss of civilian life” (S/PV.5953) and even 
threw a rhetorical question at the convened audience:  “how can we not recall the responsibility 
to protect that we hear so much about in the United Nations?” (S/PV.5952). Yet Russia’s justifi-
catory narrative in its formulation (aside from the legal inconsistencies) is quite different from 
the original R2P concept. The main characteristic feature of Russia’s assertive humanitarianism 
is its particularistic character – aimed at the protection of Russian citizens or Russian-speakers, 
selectively taking them as the unit of reference – in contrast to the universalistic humanitarian 
principle of the R2P norm. This difference was made explicit by Russia’s Foreign minister 
Lavrov, who pointed out that it was the “Constitution of the Russian Federation, the laws of the 
Russian Federation” which made it “absolutely unavoidable [for Russia] to exercise responsibil-
ity to protect” (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 09.08.2008)6.  
                                                 
 
4  See: Security Council meeting records S/PV.5951, S/PV.5952, S/PV.5953, S/PV.5954 (closed), S/PV.5961 and 
S/PV.5969. 
5  On August 8 Churkin claimed that the Georgian military operation resulted in 1,400 deaths in Tskhinvali alone 
(S/PV.5952). Two days later Russia’s representative delivered an emotional speech accusing the Georgian government 
of genocide: “What legal terms can be used to describe what has been done by the Georgian leadership? Can we use 
“ethnic cleansing”, for example, when, over a number of days, nearly 30,000 of the 120,000 people of South Ossetia 
have become refugees who have fled to Russia: more than a quarter of the population. They went across the border 
from South Ossetia to the North at great risk to their lives. Is that ethnic cleansing or is it not? Should we describe that 
as genocide or not? When out of that population of 120,000, 2,000 innocent civilians die on the first day, is that geno-
cide or is it not? How many people, how many civilians must die before we describe it as genocide?” (S/PV.5953).  
6  Here this analysis dwells away from the quite common assumption that Lavrov’s “decision to refer explicitly to R2P” 
“shows that Russia in principle agrees with the notion that violating another country’s sovereignty may be justified if 
that country commits mass atrocities against its own citizens” (Stuenkel 2014: 12). First of all, Lavrov did not explicitly 
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Another rhetorical jump, uncharacteristic of Russia’s traditional sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity-asserting stance was the invocation of the principle of self-determination in regard to its 
unilateral recognition of South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s independence. According to Churkin, 
Russia recognized the two breakaway republics “aware of its responsibility for ensuring the sur-
vival of their brotherly peoples in the face of the aggressive and chauvinistic policy of Tbilisi” 
(S/PV.5969). Thus, it was the use of “crude and blatant military force” on the part of Saakashvili, 
as well as Georgia’s long-lasting policy of exclusion and discrimination of the peoples of Abkha-
zia and South Ossetia, which altogether rendered them “considerably more grounds for recogni-
tion than Kosovo” (ibid.) and allegedly provided the legal and historical basis for Russia’s deci-
sion – which stood in conflict with the principle of territorial integrity. While the conceptualiza-
tion of peace was largely negative and narrow, the justification for the use of force was based on 
a preferential selectivity in regard to Russian-speakers.   
The position of the United States, whose UN representatives from the onset of the crisis have 
been repeatedly emphasizing the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-
interference, might appear to stand in stark contrast to Russia’s sudden humanitarian-normative 
stance. The US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad took note of Russia’s claimed intention of “pro-
tect[ing] its peacekeepers and the civilian population in South Ossetia” but stressed that its reac-
tion went “far beyond any reasonable measure required to do so” (S/PV.5953). This point was 
later reiterated by Alejandro D. Wolff, who stated that “Russia’s military offensive and political 
objectives went far beyond any reasonable or credible limit consistent with its claims” 
(S/PV.5961). To the contrary, according to the American diplomats, it was Russia’s military 
involvement which resulted in an unprecedented outbreak of violence and caused “increased 
loss of innocent life and humanitarian suffering” (S/PV.5953). At the same time the United 
States denounced Russia’s intervention as an illegitimate aggression against “a sovereign coun-
try with a democratically elected Government that pose[d] no threat to Russia” (S/PV.5961)7. 
The repeated emphasis on the democratically elected nature of Georgia’s political leadership 
rendered Russia’s military action against it unlawful and unjustifiable. In the eyes of American 
diplomats, the conflict may have started as an attempt at putting an end to Georgia’s campaign 
in South Ossetia, but was blown out of proportion by further military action on Georgian soil 
and support for the armed struggle of Abkhazians. Following the understanding of the conflict 
as an interstate one and as a military aggression “against a sovereign and democratic state of 
Georgia” (S/PV.5953), the US Representatives were continuously calling for an immediate cease-
fire on Russia’s part and for diplomatic talks between the governments of Russia and Georgia, 
demonstrating a narrow and negative understanding of peace, tied to the individua level.  
These calls apparently clashed with Russia’s newly defined humanitarianism. However, as the 
analysis suggests, Russia’s use of humanitarian rhetoric was, if not completely “hollow” 
(Badescu/Weiss 2010: 364), excusatory-exceptionalist rather than normative-universalist. Thus 
Churkin re-emphasized Russia’s respect for the principle of non-interference, stating that “of 
course, it is bad to use force”, but then immediately pointed out to the West’s own use of armed 
                                                                                                                                     
 
use the universal R2P norm, but a vaguely (and questionably) formulated principle of ex-territoriality, allegedly rooted 
in the Russian Constitution and legislation. Second, his remark, taken together with Putin’s earlier statement and 
Churkin’s comment in the Security Council, points to the specific exceptionality in the application of the use of force 
against sovereign states – not necessarily when the state commits mass atrocities, but when the “life and dignity” or 
Russian citizens are being jeopardized (S/PV.5952).       
7  Here Zalmay Khalilzad insinuated that Russia’s actual intention in Georgia was regime change and not a peacekeeping 
operation, stressing that Churkin himself acknowledged that the situation was “no longer about South Ossetia” and re-
calling a famous phone conversation between Foreign Minister Lavrov and Secretary of State Rice, in which the latter 
demanded that “Saakashvili must go” (S/PV.5953). Churkin countered by declaring “regime change [to be] an Ameri-
can expression” (ibid.), but avoided a direct answer.  
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forces in Kosovo and Iraq8 (S/PV.5969). He declared the US remarks on Russia’s “terror” against 
civilian population “absolutely unacceptable” as they came from the representative of a country 
whose actions “with regard to civilian populations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Serbia” were 
“known” to the international community (S/PV.5953). Similarly Churkin justified Russia’s 
acknowledgement of the breakaway republics’ independence in violation of the territorial integ-
rity principle pointing out to the Kosovo precedent, which he himself then renounced as a viola-
tion of particular UN resolutions and international law in general (S/PV.5969). The particularis-
tic references to the specificity of the situation and Russia’s role in it (as a traditional peacekeep-
er in the region and protector of Russians and Russian-speakers), as well as the apologetic justi-
fications of one’s own (unacknowledged) violations of the principles of international law based 
on previous precedents (regarded as illegitimate) renders Russia’s entire humanitarian-
normative argumentation rather shaky, since the conceptual core was still embedded in the tra-
ditional sovereignty-based discourse, which does not justify the use of force against sovereign 
states. This is why Churkin appeared to have found it increasingly difficult to respond to the 
repeated calls for an immediate ceasefire and diplomatic solution. Indeed, he did acknowledge 
multiple times that “peace is better than war” and rhetorically responded with such questions as 
“who would object to ceasefire? Who would object to peace?” (S/PV.5952). Yet Russia’s repre-
sentation of the conflict as “blatant and aggressive actions of the Georgian military forces against 
[…] an internationally recognized party to the conflict” (S/PV.5951) and as a “bloody military 
adventure” (S/PV.5969) against the people of the republic and Russian citizens, which the Rus-
sian Federation could not allow to “go unpunished” (S/PV.5952), determined Russia’s demands 
for an immediate cessation of violence on the part of Georgia. This explicated a rather nar-
row/negative conceptualization of peace – with an emphasis on Russia’s role as a peacekeeper 
and not party to the conflict. In this context he even complimented Ambassador Khalilzad for 
“the clearest statement about a ceasefire and peace-loving intentions”, which in his eyes should 
have rather come from the representative of Georgia (S/PV.5953).     
All in all, despite the seeming incompatibility of the views demonstrated by Russia and the Unit-
ed States in the Georgian conflict, both states expressed rather similar understandings of peace 
(negative and narrow as an end to military action and return to the pre-conflict status-quo) and 
similar views on the short-term strategies of restoring the pre-conflict status-quo (ceasefire and 
end of military hostilities; see Figure 1). Disagreements largely boiled down to the ‘blame-game’ 
with the two sides having diametrically opposing views as to who was responsible for the escala-
tion and which side should have stopped (or had already stopped) violence. In terms of the con-
ceptual consistency of both positions, it should be noted that although on the surface the argu-
mentative tables might have appeared to be turned between Russia and the United States, the 
underlying conceptual premises were pretty much in line with the states’ traditional understand-
ings. Thus, the repeated reference to Russia’s illegitimate aggression against a sovereign demo-
cratic state as employed by the US reveals a broader conceptual understanding of peace (as pre-
supposing the presence of a just political order and not only the absence of violence). At the 
same time Russia’s excusatory discourse making use of the exceptional necessity argument re-
vealed its preference for sovereignty-based status-quo, the disturbance of which deserved to be 
punished.  
4.2 The Conflict in Libya: Deliberate Misunderstandings? 
Much has already been written about the crisis in Libya and the NATO operation in general, and 
also on the specific negotiations (including those in the UN Security Council), which led to the 
adoption of Resolutions 1970 and 1973 (see e.g.: Bellamy/Williams 2011; Adler-Nissen/Pouliot 
                                                 
 
8  At this point Churkin sarcastically asked the US representative, whether “he ha[d] found the weapons of mass destruc-
tion in Iraq yet, or [was] he still looking for them”, which Wolff renounced as an attempt at comparing “completely un-
related and dissimilar situations” (S/PV.5969). 
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2014). The UNSC-mandated authorization of the use of force for humanitarian purposes with-
out the consent of the government in-power has now become a largely contested case of R2P 
use. The NATO operation in Libya is often being treated as a “model intervention” and as an 
example of best practice implementation of the emerging R2P norm by some academics and 
practitioners (see e.g.: Daalder/Stavridis 2012; Chivvis 2012; Etzioni 2012). Recent studies, how-
ever, suggest that the positive assessment of the campaign has been an over-estimation 
(Kuperman 2013). NATO’s conduct in Libya was harshly criticized by BRICS diplomats from 
the early days of the operation. While Washington largely continues to view the Libyan opera-
tion as a success, for BRICS states, it rather presented a “dangerous precedent” (Stuenkel 2014: 
18). In theoretical and analytical terms, there is also little consensus among the academics as to 
the underlying motivations and intentions (be they normative or materialistic) of those who 
actively lobbied for the intervention and eventually carried it out (the P3), and those who later 
strongly condemned it, despite having initially mandated the use of force in the Security Council 
(Russia and China, for example). This analysis focuses on the specific conceptualizations of 
peace invoked by Russia and the United States in the UNSC debate on the conflict.  
The crisis in Libya developed within the overall context of the Arab Spring, with popular upris-
ings having (by that time) already led to the ousting of Tunisian long-time President Ben Ali and 
to the resignation of Egypt’s President Mubarak. With events on the ground developing rapidly, 
the Security Council acted extremely fast in response (Adler-Nissen/Pouliot 2014: 10). On Feb-
ruary 28, 2011 (only two weeks after the regime’s violent crackdown on the protesters in Ben-
ghazi) the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1970, which imposed an arms em-
bargo on the Libyan state, introduced sanctions against government officials responsible for 
violence against the civilian population and referred the case to the Prosecutor of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC). Less than a month later, when these measures had proven incapa-
ble of deterring the regime from further threats of attacks against civilians, the Security Council 
met for the second time on March 17 to pass Resolution 1973, which authorized the establish-
ment of a no-fly zone and the use of “all necessary measures […] to protect civilians and civilian 
populated areas under threat of attack”. However, the resolution explicitly “exclude[ed] a for-
eign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory” and reaffirmed “the sover-
eignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”9. 
Days later NATO began its air force operation, launching air strikes on Libyan military posi-
tions. With the direct air support on the part of NATO the rapidly growing rebel forces soon 
launched a military offensive against the Qadhafi-loyal army. The campaign effectively ended in 
regime change, with Qadhafi executed on October 20, 2011 and power being transferred to the 
National Transitional Council. Despite the still ongoing local conflicts and persisting internal 
violence, which has slowly developed into a protracted civil war, October 23, 2011 is considered 
to be the formal end of the Libyan civil war (as announced by the National Transtitional Coun-
cil; see also: ICG 2012: 1)10. Therefore this study only considers the four Security Council meet-
ings which took place in the course of the conflict from February 26 to September 16, 2011.11  
The United States (together with the United Kingdom and France) acted as one of the main 
proponents of the use of force for the protection of civilians and as one of the sponsors of both 
Resolutions 1970 and 1973. Studies suggest that while initially the leading role largely belonged 
to British and French diplomats with the United States being more reluctant towards the mili-
tary option during the discussions on Resolution 1970 (Bellamy/Williams 2011: 839), Washing-
                                                 
 
9  See: S/RES/1973 (2011). 
10  On October 31 the Security Council passed Resolution 2011 on the prevention of the proliferation of arms and other 
lethal materials. The subsequent Security Council meetings on the situation in Libya have primarily been addressing 
questions of post-conflict settlement and ICC investigation and have served as an arena for a public exchange of accu-
sations and justifications on the misuse of the UN mandate. 
11  See: Security Council meeting records S/PV.6491, S/PV.6498, S/PV.6528 and S/PV.6620. 
13 
 
PRIF Working Paper No. 22 
ton quickly made up its mind afterwards and acted as one of the main moral advocates and sup-
porters of Resolution 1973 (Adler-Nissen/Pouliot 2014: 13; Steele/Heinze 2014: 106). Russia, on 
its part, supported the 1970 Resolution, but abstained on Resolution 1973, which authorized the 
use of force in order to protect the civilian population against the Libyan government. Despite 
the apparent unity of the Council in the earlier discussions (with Russia reportedly not putting 
up much of a fight), the specific understandings of the measures and their implications revealed 
considerable differences among the US and Russian representatives.    
Commenting on the adopted resolution 1970, the Russian UN Representative condemned the 
“use of military force against peaceful demonstrators and all other manifestations of violence” 
and proclaimed them “absolutely unacceptable” (S/PV.6491). Although this resonated with the 
US Ambassador Rice’s statement that “violence of any sort against the Libyan people by their 
Government or security forces” could not be tolerated, Churkin also emphasized that the “set-
tlement of the situation in Libya [was] possible only through political means”. He also stressed 
that the resolution itself did not in fact “enjoin sanctions, even indirect, for forceful interference 
in Libya’s affairs”, but was necessary to “preserve Libya as a united, sovereign state with territo-
rial integrity” (ibid.). This stood in observable contrast to the US Representative’s demands for 
Muammar Qadhafi “to do what is right for his country, by leaving” immediately and promise 
that the Libyan leaders would be “held accountable for violating [the universal] rights and for 
failing to meet their most basic responsibilities to their people” (ibid.). Both states shared a posi-
tive understanding of peace and referred to the individual level, but the United States’ vision of 
peace was broad, as compared to Russia’s narrow one.  
While these discrepancies did not prevent the Council from adopting this and the consequent 
resolution, the conceptual divide was gradually becoming ever more evident. Ambassador Rice 
delivered a hasty speech explaining the US vote on Resolution 1973, calling it a response “to the 
Libyan people’s cry for help” and announcing her goevrnment’s commitment to the “Libyan 
people in support of their universal rights” (S/PV.6498). Churkin also reiterated Russia’s posi-
tion on the “clear unacceptability of the use of force against the civilian population”, but com-
plained that the resolution draft “[had morphed] before [the Council’s] very eyes, transcending 
the initial concept” of the no-fly zone, and “potentially open[ing] the door to large-scale military 
intervention” (ibid.). According to Churkin, the fact that “the passion of some Council members 
for methods involving force prevailed” was “unfortunate and regrettable” and stressed that the 
“responsibility for the inevitable humanitarian consequences of the excessive use of outside force 
(emphasis added) in Libya [would] fall fair and square on the shoulders of those who might 
undertake such action” (ibid.).  
In the aftermath of the adoption of Resolution 1973 and in the course of NATO’s military opera-
tion, Russia harshly criticized the manner of NATO’s involvement in Libya stressing that the 
“disproportionate use of force [was] unacceptable” (S/PV.6528). The United States, on the other 
hand, kept repeatedly referring to the atrocities committed by the Qadhafi regime, announcing 
that the Libyan government lost “any and all legitimacy to lead” the people of Libya, who “de-
serve[d] leaders who share[d] their aspirations to freedom, democracy and dignity” (ibid.). The-
se arguments were invoked as an effective moral justification for the use of force. Russia, on the 
other hand, continuously stressed its conviction, that “the quickest way to ensure robust security 
for the civilian population and the long-term stabilization of the situation in Libya [was] imme-
diate ceasefire” (S/PV.6498). With the NATO operation already underway, Russia once again 
announced that the only way to effectively halt violence was “an immediate ceasefire and the 
necessary efforts for a political settlement” (S/PV.6528).       
Summing up, it should be noted that despite the initial superficial agreement over the root caus-
es of the conflict and over the necessary means of addressing it, the Libyan case demonstrated a 
clear gap between the actors’ conceptual premises in regard to peace and use of force as a means 
of conflict settlement (see Figure 2). The United States was explicitly operating with a broad 
understanding of peace, which not only implied the absence of violence, but “a new society 
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based on democracy, pluralism and the rule of law” (S/PV.6620). This did not necessarily stand 
in conflict with Russia’s support for “the transition process in Libya” (ibid.). Nonetheless, the 
general understanding propagated by Russian Representative Churkin was that of putting an 
end to violence and military hostilities – “the establishment of peace […] through political and 
diplomatic channels” (ibid.). Subsequently Churkin put the blame for the perpetuating violence 
on pretty much all sides of the conflict responsible for civilian casualties (Qadhafi security forc-
es, armed rebels) and accused NATO of disregarding the UN mandate, resulting in “air strikes 
that also targeted civilian facilities and killed civilians” (ibid.). The United States in contrast saw 
their mission as support for the people of Libya “who suffered many years under one of the 
world’s most brutal dictatorships” in their “efforts to restore order and bring about democracy” 
(ibid.). The occurrence of regime change as a result of the NATO military involvement is still 
being heatedly debated within the academic, political, and public circles (McMillan/Mickler 
2013: 306). Yet the early statements of US Ambassador Rice echoing the words of President 
Obama on the illegitimacy of the Libyan leadership and on the need of ensuring the Libyan peo-
ple’s “ability to shape their own future” (S/PV.6491) clearly suggested that there could not be 
any peace while the regime of Muammar Qadhafi was still in power. Hence the divergent ap-
proaches to the concept of peace (US’ broad vs. Russia’s narrow one) manifested themselves in 
the actors’ differing visions of peace strategies and the justifiability/non-justifiability of the use 
of force.  
4.3 The Syrian Crisis: Agreeing to Disagree 
The inception of the Syrian crisis ran almost parallel to the developments in Libya. The popular 
mass uprising against President Al-Assad, inspired by the successful examples of Tunisia and 
Egypt, began shortly after the first protests against the Qadhafi government in mid-March 2011, 
but the crisis in Syria – both in regard to its internal developments and international response to 
them – was to take a strikingly different course from that in Libya and gradually transformed 
from popular dissent into a prolonged large-scale civil war.   
It is widely believed that the alleged misuse of the UN mandate in Libya became one of the rea-
sons for the cautious approach towards the settlement of the crisis in Syria on the part of BRICS 
states (McMillan/Mickler 2013; Stuenkel 2014). It has even been claimed that “Syrians have paid 
the price of NATO excesses in Libya” (Thakur 2013: 70). Russia and China specifically have 
acted as the most severe opponents of direct or indirect interference, while Russia was later also 
portrayed as the “diplomatic shield” for the Syrian regime (Allison 2013: 798). In the course of 
the conflict (from the end of March 2011 to the end of May 2014) Russia together with China 
blocked four Security Council resolutions (S/2011/612; S/2012/77; S/2012/538 and S/2014/348) – 
both mildly and harshly formulated – which contained condemnations of the human rights 
abuses on the part of Al-Assad’s regime or even indirectly allowed for the possibility of external 
interference with the events in Syria. Many studies have already looked into the complex mo-
tives of Russia’s support for the Syrian regime (domestic, material and ideational) and its unwa-
vering stance towards the crisis (see e.g.: Baev 2013; Allison 2013; Charap 2013). The US ap-
proach to Syria, on the other hand, has been transforming over the three years of the raging 
conflict and has been informed by different options: from a US military intervention for the 
protection of civilians, targeting terrorists, or punishing the Syrian leadership for the use of 
chemical weapons against civilians and opposition groups to a more restrained approach weigh-
ing the possible unintended negative consequences of such an intervention (Blanchard et al. 
2014: 19).  
From the beginning of the crisis, Russian diplomats have been continuously and consistently 
advocating ceasefire and political dialogue as the first and foremost measure needed to end vio-
lence and the only appropriate means of achieving peace. Churkin stressed that “violence by all 
sides must cease, and the crisis [could] be resolved only (emphasis added) through a Syrian-led 
inclusive political process” (S/PV.6710). In the early stages of the conflict Russia actively called 
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for political reforms (led and implemented by the Syrian government) in order to restore civil 
peace and took a firm stance against any kind of outside interference following the Libyan mod-
el, which, in the eyes of Russia “should be excluded from global practices once and for all” 
(S/PV.6627). Russia further stressed that “a significant number of Syrians [did] not agree with 
the demand for a quick regime change and would rather see gradual changes, believing that they 
have to be implemented while maintaining civil peace and harmony in the country” (ibid.). Later 
on, the call for socio-economic and political reforms gave way to demands for political dialogue 
with the “constructive patriotic groups of the Syrian opposition” (ibid.) in the form of a “Syrian-
led dialogue on the basis of the principles of international law” (S/PV.6906).  
While Churkin proclaimed that “there [was] no alternative to dialogue” (S/PV.6627), Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton asserted that peace could only be reached by the establishment of the 
“rule of law and civil society on the ruins of a brutal and failed dictatorship”. The alternative – 
“more of al-Assad’s brutal rule – [was] no alternative at all” for the United States (S/PV.6710). 
From the outset, the US perceived the crisis within the general context of the Arab Spring, i.e. as 
a peaceful struggle of the oppressed people against an authoritarian regime. Its’ representatives 
called the members of the Security Council (hinting particularly at Russia) to decide whether 
“during a time of sweeping change in the Middle East, [they] [would] stand with peaceful pro-
testers crying out for freedom or with a regime of thugs with guns that tramples human dignity 
and human rights” (S/PV.6627). Since the regime was seen as the main obstacle in the way of 
conflict settlement and sustainable peace, Ambassador Rice proclaimed that “political transition 
would be the fastest and most effective way to end the horrific bloodshed” (S/PV.6906).  Guided 
by this assumption, the US promised to “continue to work with the friends of the Syrian people 
to increase pressure on the regime, support the Syrian opposition, marshal relief for the Syrian 
people and help prepare for a Syrian-led democratic transition” (S/PV.6816). While in the early 
stages of the crisis the United States called for targeted sanctions and arms embargo in order to 
“bring pressure” and introduce “firm actions against the regime”, later Susan Rice expressed her 
conviction that “the [democratic] transition [was not] only inevitable; it [had] already begun” 
and threatened that the United States “[would] not wait for all members of the Council to get on 
the right side of history” (S/PV.6847).  
Thus, the conceptualization of peace invoked by the United States in regard to the conflict in 
Syria was positive and broad – conceived of as not only the end of physical violence, but also as 
cessation of political oppression and respect for both fundamental human rights and political 
and civil rights, providing “dignity, freedom and hope to the Syrian people” (S/PV.7007). Seeing 
the al-Assad regime as the main perpetrator of atrocities and the only force responsible for the 
perpetuation of violence, the US put strong emphasis on state violence (physical and non-
physical) and the resulting suffering of individuals (see Figure 7). This understanding was also 
reflected in the US-advocated peace strategy, where post-conflict settlement and restoration of 
peace were seen as a long-term process of democratic transition with the development of demo-
cratic institutions, rule of law, civil society and respect for human rights (political and civil 
rights, minority rights and non-discrimination). Consequently no peace could be possible while 
the regime was still in power, and this guided the US support for internal resistance and calls for 
external action. Within this context the use of force was not only perceived as justifiable, but 
necessary as a means to end the regime’s atrocities. 
The Russian conceptualization of peace here was, on the contrary, mainly negative –  perceived 
as the absence of physical violence with ceasefire postulated as the main priority – and for the 
most part narrow (understood as cessation of military hostilities) with reference to the need of 
national reconciliation and civil peace (see Figure 8). Russia acknowledged both state and non-
state actors as the perpetrators of violence (understood as loss of human lives and individual 
suffering) and therefore insisted that all sides should lay down arms. The resulting peace strategy 
was based on the understanding of peace as gradual process, the foremost condition for which 
was ceasefire, political dialogue between the regime and the opposition with the aim of an open-
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end internal political settlement process. Notably conflict settlement was envisioned as a Syrian-
led political process “without foreign interference (emphasis added), through national dialogue 
between the Government and the opposition, during which they could freely, democratically 
and without any preconditions (emphasis added) determine the future order of the country” 
(S/PV.6816). Consequently Russian representatives have throughout the crisis been putting 
strong emphasis on non-interference, since third-party involvement, according to their general 
logic, would have only led to further destabilization. Moreover, third-party support for the op-
position in the eyes of the Russian diplomats had already led to the perpetuation and intensifica-
tion of the conflict. The only acceptable means of international involvement was bi- and multi-
lateral diplomacy and international monitoring. The attainment of peace through the use of 
force was not only seen as non-justifiable, but counterproductive and potentially destabilizing.  
To sum up, while Russia’s conceptual approach to the Syrian crisis can be best summarized us-
ing Churkin’s own words that “bad peace is better than a good quarrel” (S/PV.7180), for the 
United States this reductionist position was dismissed as “back[ing] the Syrian regime, no matter 
what it [did]” (ibid.). The different views on what constituted peace consequently played them-
selves out in the opposing views on conflict settlement. Russia’s negative and narrow definition, 
linked to the collective level clashed with the US positive and broad one, taking the individual as 
the unit of reference, while ceasefire, political dialogue and diplomacy as advocated by Russia 
clashed with support for internal resistance, sanctions and eventual US military intervention 
(see Figure 3).  
4.4  The Ukraine Crisis: Finger-Pointing and no Peace in Sight 
The evolving crisis in Ukraine has developed rapidly and unexpectedly and now risks turning 
into a prolonged inner- and interstate conflict. The conflict started at the end of November 2013 
with popular protests against President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to postpone the signing of 
the association agreement with the EU. The protest quickly turned into a political rally against 
the corrupt government. After the mass demonstrations and the government’s response turned 
violent, an Agreement on the settlement of the crisis brokered by the Foreign Ministers of Ger-
many, France and Poland, was signed between Yanukovych and the representatives of the oppo-
sition on February 21, 2014. Immediately afterwards Yanukovych fled Kyiv, the presidential 
power being transferred to the Chairman of the Parliament followed by the announcement of an 
interim government. Shortly after the power change in Kyiv, the so-called “self-defense forces” 
in Crimea (some of them wearing Russian military uniform without insignia) started taking over 
government buildings, proclaiming their dissatisfaction with the new authorities. Meanwhile the 
Crimean Parliament dismissed the Government of Crimea, appointed a new Prime Minister and 
announced a referendum on Crimea’s autonomy. The referendum took place on March 16, 2014 
– two months earlier than initially planned – and contained a question, whether the people of 
the peninsula wanted Crimea and the city of Sevastopol to join the Russian Federation as a fed-
eral subject. With the reported overwhelming majority of 96,77% in favor of joining Russia, the 
Crimean Autonomous Republic and the Federal City of Sevastopol were officially incorporated 
into Russia less than a week later.  
In the following weeks the so-called “pro-Russia” activists started occupying government build-
ings in the East of Ukraine. In mid-April, the interim government in Kyiv announced a counter-
offensive to retake control in the Eastern regions. At this time a Joint Statement (Geneva State-
ment on Ukraine) between the EU, US, Russia and Ukraine was issued as an attempt to diffuse 
the crisis. The statement demanded the disarmament of armed groups and vacation of illegally 
occupied buildings and public places (in all of Ukraine). However, the provisions of the docu-
ments were ignored by both sides, each of which consequently blamed the other for breaking the 
agreement. On May 11 the self-proclaimed Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk held status refer-
enda announcing their independence from Ukraine. These went unrecognized by Russia and the 
rest of the international community. After the presidential poll on May 25, the newly elected 
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Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko announced a fifteen-point peace plan, which was per-
ceived as an ultimatum by the self-proclaimed separatist leaders. In the beginning of July, the 
earlier announced short ceasefire was broken (both sides once again blaming each other for 
continued violence) and the Ukrainian authorities resumed the “anti-terrorist” operation in 
Eastern Ukraine.  
Since the ousting of President Yanukovyich the Security Council met eleven times (from March 
1 to June 24, 2014) upon request of the representatives of Ukraine and the Russian Federation in 
order to discuss the situation on the Crimean Peninsula prior to and after Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea and Sevastopol, as well as the ongoing armed hostilities in Eastern Ukraine. Russia uni-
laterally vetoed the draft Resolution S/2014/189 which reaffirmed the “sovereignty, independ-
ence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders” and 
renounced the Crimean referendum as invalid (see S/RES/189). Russia delivered arguments 
based on self-determination similar to those employed in the 2008 Russian-Georgian crisis. The 
United States, on the other hand, denounced Russia’s actions as violation of Ukraine’s sover-
eignty and territorial integrity, renounced the Crimean referendum, as well as the referenda in 
Donetsk and Luhansk as illegal and unlawful and continue to accuse Russia of direct and indi-
rect support for the armed separatists in Eastern Ukraine.  
As in the case of Georgia, the self-determination arguments were employed by Russia inconsist-
ently and on a situational basis in order to provide a more or less morally and legally acceptable 
justification for the annexation of Crimea. This time, however, the justification for the recogni-
tion of Crimea’s independence and its incorporation into the Russian Federation occurred with 
a mix of universalist-normative and particularistic-exceptionalist discourses. Ambassador 
Churkin re-affirmed that “the achievement of the right to self-determination in the form of 
separation from an existing State is an extraordinary measure” (S/PV.7134), “applied when fur-
ther coexistence within a single State becomes impossible” (S/PV.7138). Yet he declared that “in 
the case of Crimea, it obviously arose as a result of the legal vacuum created by the violent coup 
against the legitimate Government carried out by nationalist radicals in Kyiv, as well as by their 
direct threats (emphasis added) to impose their order throughout the territory of Ukraine” 
(S/PV.7134). The use of selectively chosen precedents of past or future referenda in Puerto Rico, 
Gibraltar, the Falkland Islands, Catalonia and Scotland (see ibid.) combined with references to 
certain provisions of international law and the overall historical context, coupled with claims of 
alleged discrimination and threats of violence against the Russian-speaking population of Cri-
mea resulted in a constructed narrative of a kind of “preventive secession” (authors’ term). The 
narrative was close to the one employed during the Georgian crisis as it once again selectively 
referred to the specific collective level – putting Russian-speakers and their fundamental human 
rights (this time also civil and political rights) in need of protection from “calls […] for violence 
against Russian-speaking Ukrainians and Russians in general, with all the signs of ethnic cleans-
ing, and for the armed overthrow of the legal authorities” (S/PV.7144). “The extraordinary situa-
tion in Ukraine and the threat posed to Russian citizens”, in the worst-case scenario, provided 
the justification for the use of force and military intervention (S/PV.7125). The broad and posi-
tive conceptualization (with a selective unit of reference) of peace on Russia’s part translated 
into a kind of “preventive interventionism” (authors’ term) on behalf of the Russian and Rus-
sian-speaking population and support for their self-determination rights.  
For the United States, on the other hand, Russia’s actions constituted an “intervention […] 
without legal basis” and a violation of Russia’s commitment “to protecting the sovereignty, terri-
torial integrity and independence of Ukraine” (S/PV.7124). The conflict consequently represent-
ed “not an eastern Ukrainian spring”, but “a well-orchestrated campaign, with external support, 
to destabilize the Ukrainian State” (S/PV.7165). Russia’s concerns over the instability in the East 
of Ukraine were disregarded as “falsehoods”, since it was “Russia [which] [was] causing the 
instability” (S/PV.7167). Guided by this understanding, the United States justified the Ukrainian 
state’s use of force against the insurgents in the Eastern regions as “reasonable, […] proportional 
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and […] what any other countries would have done in the face of that [external] threat” 
(S/PV.7167) for the sake of a “peaceful, democratic, inclusive and united Ukraine” (S/PV.7167). 
Similar to Russia, the US advocated a positive and broad understanding of peace (with a refer-
ence to individuals as part of the unified state collective). Consequently the (democratic) state 
possessed the legitimate right to the use of force against outside aggression for the protection of 
its citizens.   
The Russian-US debate on the Ukrainian crisis at the UN Security Council is in way unique, 
since it was much more concentrated on mutual accusations than on the prospective visions of 
peace and the means of achieving it (see Figure 4). The United States saw Russia as the main 
aggressor, initiator and perpetuator of violence and hostilities. Russia, in turn, blamed the Unit-
ed States for its support in the violent overthrow of the “legitimate” President Yanukovych, ac-
cused non-state radical groups (the far-right Pravyy Sektor being depicted as the most ominous 
and dangerous one) of violence and threats of violence against Russian-speaking Ukrainians and 
Russians, pointed to the Ukrainian government’s disregard of the rights and aspirations of the 
people in Eastern Ukraine, and accused it of excessive use of force against the rebels of the so-
called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. However, the contours of the actors’ peace 
conceptions can still be traced in individual statements of Ambassadors Vitaly Churkin and 
Samantha Power. For the United States, peace in Ukraine would mean an end to the military 
insurgency and Russia’s aggression, and would pre-suppose support for the desire of the Ukrain-
ian people “to build a strong and united country with a robust democracy and effective national 
and regional institutions” (S/PV.7157). While Russia’s conceptual vision of peace in Ukraine is 
much less clear (and much less salient), it is generally presented as a “path to normal develop-
ment whereby every region, every ethnic and religious group would know what to expect tomor-
row” (S/PV.7157). Consequently Russia’s officially voiced peace strategy was one of “ceasefire 
[which] should lead to dialogue among all the warring parties in order to reach a compromise 
acceptable to all, so that people living in south-east Ukraine feel without a doubt that they are an 
integral part of the country, with all the rights of citizens of that State, and that those rights are 
guaranteed, including by the Constitution” (S/PV.7205). With the opposing visions of the root 
causes and initiators of the conflict, both sides upheld diverging perspectives on what could 
constitute a peaceful solution – for Russia it was an inner-Ukrainian dialogue (with the sepa-
ratists at the negotiation table), while for the United States it was in effect a truce between Russia 
and the new democratic Ukraine, capable of determining its own future without outside pres-
sure. The striking particularity of the Ukrainian crisis is that the United States and Russia did 
not even possess a minimal consensual vision of what constituted the conflict (outside aggres-
sion vs. brutal suppression of dissenters). Nonetheless, at the conceptual level, they shared a 
broad positive understanding of peace and subsequently reserved the right to the legitimate use 
of force (on the part of the Ukrainian state, on the one hand, and as a preventive/supportive 
measure by Russia) as ultima ratio.    
5 CONCLUSTION: ‘JUST PEACE’, JUST PEACE – WHAT PEACE?  
The case studies presented above provide a summary of the voiced conceptualizations of peace 
and peace strategies as employed by Russian and American representatives in the course of UN 
Security Council discussions over four recent and/or ongoing conflicts. These conflicts were and 
are of direct importance for the states in question: the Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008, the 
Libyan crisis and NATO intervention of 2011, the ongoing civil war in Syria (2011-2014) and the 
evolving crisis in Ukraine (2014). The aim of this comparative investigation was to look at how 
state actors conceptualized peace in each of the studied conflicts, how these specific conceptuali-
zations were reflected in their proposed crisis resolution strategies, and how these in turn inter-
related with each other in their communication and over time. Table 1 summarizes the actors’ 
main positions and understandings.  
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Table 1. US’ and Russia’s Voiced Peace Conceptions and Strategies in Comparison 
 Russian Federation United States 
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End of Russian aggres-
sion, legitimate use of 
force against the sepa-
ratists, diplomacy. 
As this brief summary demonstrates, the United States mostly conceptualized peace in positive 
and broad terms – understood as the absence of violence, but also as respect for basic human 
rights, provision of civil and political rights within a just political order substantiated by a dem-
ocratic form of government. The US position on Georgia supposedly presented an outlier case 
since emphasis was primarily put on ending physical violence and military hostilities without 
explicit reference to any particular vision of a post-conflict order. However, a deeper examina-
tion of the US narrative revealed that the conceptual core of its argumentation remained pretty 
much in line with the traditional understanding of the legitimate democratic state and the non-
justifiability of outside aggression against it. By contrast, Russia’s basic conceptualization of 
peace is a narrow and mainly negative one, perceived as only the absence of physical violence – 
the so-called “bad peace”, which is better than “a good quarrel” (S/PV.7180). The Ukrainian 
crisis presented a clear deviation in this sense, since Russia adopted a new narrative explicating 
respect for civil and political rights of the discriminated minorities and presenting oneself as the 
guardian and supporter of the legitimate interests of the Russian-speaking population in the 
neighboring country.  
An interesting point for comparison is the referential level denoting the addressees of peace. 
Whereas the United States routinely referred to the individual (human security) as the unit of 
reference, this particular aspect is more diffuse and situational in the Russian case. This was 
most visible in the case of Georgia and Ukraine (as compared to Libya and Syria), when a very 
specific group (Russians, Russian-speakers or “compatriots”) was brought out as the primary 
object for protection and subject to particular rights. But there were also notable differences 
between the cases of Libya, where Russia emphasized individual security (security of the civilian 
population) and Syria, where the collective/state level was prioritized.    
As far as the states’ propagated peace strategies are concerned, notable variation can be identi-
fied here as well. The US tended to legitimize the use of force for the protection of civilians 
and/or preservation/establishment of a just political order. By contrast Russia’s propagated 
peace strategies appeared much more situational. Russia argued as a strong proponent of non-
interference, diplomacy and political dialogue in the cases of Libya (despite its abstention at the 
UNSC) and Syria. Georgia and Ukraine, on the other hand, presented cases of “intervention for 
protection” and “preventive intervention” (although Russia still officially denies its involvement 
in the Ukrainian conflict) legitimized by means of a mixture of particularistic and normative 
universalistic arguments.  
While this analysis only looked at the voiced conceptual understanding invoked by the actors in 
specific conflict situations, we can still draw a number of interesting conclusions relating to the 
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conceptual linkages and interrelations between peace conceptions and strategies as employed by 
different actors. 
In general, the empirical analysis confirmed the theoretical assumption that broad conceptuali-
zations of peace can be more easily reconciled with the use of force as a legitimate means of 
establishing peace (Brock 2002: 101; Müller 2003: 212). However, as we have observed in the 
Russian narrative on the legitimization of its intervention in Georgia, a negative and narrow 
basic peace conception could also be rhetorically accommodated to suit an interventionist agen-
da. Nonetheless, it has been confirmed that a basic negative and narrow understanding of peace 
is more prone to prioritize diplomatic and political crisis solutions. Also, while human security 
(individuals as primary peace addressees) references could be expected to be used in connection 
to humanitarian interventionist conflict approaches, this could not be fully confirmed by the 
empirical analysis. The US consistently took the individual as the reference point, but did not 
argue in favor of forceful solutions in all the presented conflicts, whereas Russia referred to spe-
cific collective entities (Russian-speakers) in order to legitimize its protective intervention in 
Georgia and preventive intervention in Ukraine. 
Overall, it can be stated that while agreement over the conceptualization of peace does not im-
pede further disagreement as to the appropriate peace strategies, disagreement at the conceptual 
level fosters deeper disagreements in regard to the preferred policy options. As the cases of 
Georgia and Ukraine have shown, similar approaches to peace in terms of its basic conceptual-
ization (negative and narrow in the case of Georgia and positive and broad in relation to the 
crisis in Ukraine) did not translate into similar strategies of resolving the conflicts. However the 
differences here were not of a conceptual, but primarily of an interpretative nature – pertaining 
to what constituted the conflict itself. At the same time the diverging conceptions of peace in the 
prominent case of Syria (negative and narrow as seen by Russia in contrast to the positive and 
broad vision advocated by the United States) also manifested themselves in deep disagreements 
over the preferred solutions to the crisis. These disagreements effectively blocked the decision-
making process in the Security Council on the issue for more than three years. 
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